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THE KEMP-GARCIA ENTERPRISE ZONE
BILL: A NEW, LESS COSTLY APPROACH
TO URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
This Comment discusses the Kemp-Garcia "Urban Jobs and Enterprise
Zone" bill introduced in Congress on June 12, 1980. The bill is currently
being revised, and several drafts of the proposed legislation are
anticipated.
I. Introduction
One of the many domestic problems facing the Reagan Adminis-
tration is the plight of the nation's poorest urban areas. The Presi-
dent has indicated that he favors the redevelopment of such areas
through the creation of enterprise zones.1 Enterprise zone propos-
als come in many forms, but generally an enterprise zone is a small
area, such as an inner-city neighborhood, which offers tax abate-
ments and other incentives to businesses willing to locate within
the boundaries of the zone. The zones are intended to rebuild eco-
nomically depressed areas with private capital rather than public
funds.2
1. President Reagan began endorsing enterprise zones during the 1980 Presidential cam-
paign. At the Republican National Convention, the delegates adopted a plank in the party
platform which pledged that as part of a Republican effort to revitalize neighborhoods
"[l1ocal government will be invited to designate specific depressed areas as jobs and enter-
prise zones." Republican National Convention, Platform (1980), reprinted in 126 CONG.
Rzc. S10379, 10385 (daily ed. July 31, 1980). In the nationally televised Presidential debate
of 1980, Reagan emphasized his support for enterprise zones:
I have been talking to a number of Congressmen who have much the same idea that I
have. And that is that in the inner-city areas, that in cooperation with local govern-
ment and with national government and using tax incentives and with cooperation
with the private sector, that we have development zones. Let the local entity, the city,
declare this particular area based on the standards of the percentage of people on
welfare, unemployed and so forth in that area. And then, through tax incentives, in-
duce the creation of businesses providing jobs and so forth in those areas.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1980, at A26, col. 5.
2. Enterprise zones are not without their costs to the public. The initial loss of tax reve-
nues due to exemptions is borne by non-exempt taxpayers. Supporters of enterprise zones
argue, however, that tax payments by businesses in depressed neighborhoods are already
low and, furthermore, that all initial losses will be recouped with the addition of new busi-
nesses and employees to the tax rolls. Butler, For 'Enterprise Zones', N.Y. Times, June 13,
1980, at A29, col. 3. Another cost to the public is the funding of the bureaucracy which
attends every government program. See note 229 infra and accompanying text for a cost
analysis of the enterprise zone bill now before Congress.
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The idea of using tax incentives to spur the growth and develop-
ment of particular industries is not a new one.3 What distinguishes
the enterprise zone proposals of today, though, from past tax in-
centive statutes is the grand scale of the new programs. For the
first time, the federal government would provide major incentives
to encourage the private sector to undertake the herculean task of
rebuilding the nation's most impoverished areas. That task has
been assumed by federal and local governments in recent years
through the implementation of such well intended, but not always
successful, programs as urban renewal and model cities. Propo-
nents of enterprise zones contend that government can no longer
perform the task alone."
Enterprise zones were first proposed in Great Britain in the late
1970's.5 They grew out of a "Freeport" model conceived by a so-
cialist professor of urban planning, Peter Hall, who believed that
permitting "fairly shameless free enterprise" in abandoned neigh-
borhoods would result in the rebuilding of those neighborhoods.'
Sir Geoffrey Howe, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, suggested
that the Freeport model be tested in high unemployment areas
throughout Britain in what he called "enterprise zones." As pro-
posed by Sir Geoffrey, enterprise zones were designed to free resi-
dent businesses of as many government controls as possible.' The
3. Previous tax incentives designed to stimulate private enterprise are discussed in sec-
tion III. See notes 68-153 infra and accompanying text.
4. President Reagan dramatically illustrated his belief that industry must play a leading
role in the rebuilding of cities when, during the 1980 campaign, he returned to the same
South Bronx street that President Carter had visited three years earlier. Noting the failure
of federal funds to produce any visible results in the devastated neighborhood, Reagan indi-
cated that he favored the use of tax incentives to encourage private enterprise to rebuild the
area. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1980, at A16, col. 4.
5. See S. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: PIONEERING IN THE INNER CITY (1980).
6. Id. at 22. Hall viewed his Freeport model as a "nonplan" involving three central ele-
ments: 1) free trade with a prohibition against sales taxes and duties on foreign goods; 2)
free enterprise with limitations on regulations, taxes, and social services; and 3) free choice
of residence with existing residents welcome to stay, and enjoy low taxes but few social
services, or to leave. Hall saw the model as an "'extremely drastic last-ditch solution'" to
be attempted only in areas "'largely abandoned and denuded of people.'" Id.
7. Id.
8. For example, businesses located in enterprise zones under this plan would not be sub-
ject to wage and price controls, property taxes, zoning laws, or rent control. Id. at 23-24.
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sites for the first enterprise zones in Britain were announced in
1980.9
The idea was exported to America, where Representative Jack
Kemp introduced the first enterprise zone bill in Congress on May
1, 1980.10 A second bill, which was co-sponsored by Representative
Robert Garcia, followed on June 12, 1980.11 The express purpose of
the Kemp-Garcia bill is to "amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 to provide certain tax incentives for individuals and busi-
nesses in depressed areas." ' Unlike the British program, the bill
would not relieve resident businesses of any of their responsibili-
ties to maintain environmental, safety, minimum wage, or fair la-
bor standards." It relies instead on the notion that a favorable tax
structure will be sufficient to induce new businesses to locate in
areas designated as enterprise zones."
The Kemp-Garcia bill provides, in general, that enterprise zones
are to be designated by the Secretary of Commerce at the request
of state and local governments." To qualify, an area must have an
especially high rate of unemployment or a large percentage of fam-
ilies living below the poverty level.' e In addition, the bill requires
9.. See notes 147-53 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the.British zones.
10. H.R. 7240, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill was co-sponsored by a group of
twenty-four Republicans.
11. H.R. 7563, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill was the product of bipartisan efforts.
In addition to Rep. Garcia, the Democrats who sponsored the bill were Rep. Edgar of Penn-
sylvania and Rep. Nowak of New York. In* addition to Kemp, the Republicans who spon-
sored the bill were Rep. Fenwick of New Jersey, Rep. Stockman of Michigan, and Rep.
Michel of Illinois. Senators Boschwitz of Minnesota and Chafee of Rhode Island, both
Republicans, introduced the same bill in the Senate on June 12, 1980. S. 2823, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rc. S7007 (daily ed. June 13, 1980).
12. Id.
13. Acknowledging the differences among the various plans, an aide to Rep. Kemp re-
marked, "We're not interested in establishing child-labor zones." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980,
§ 4, at 2, col. 3.
14. Rep. Garcia, in urging Congress to pass the bill, stated:
Safety and health standards would be maintained, of course, as would all existing
social programs and regulations. The hope of this legislation, however, is that as the
depressed areas encounter enhanced economic opportunities the residents of those
areas will be able to get off the welfare rolls and onto the payrolls.
126 CONG. REC. E3880 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980).
15. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(a)(1). See notes 155-56 infra and ac-
companying text.
16. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(c)(2). See notes 161-67 infra and ac-
companying text.
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local governments to make a permanent reduction in the real prop-
erty tax rate in a zone.1 7 Once an area qualifies as an enterprise
zone, the federal government reduces not only social security taxes
for most employers and employees 8 but also taxes on capital gains
and corporate income.1' Further, certain businesses may take ad-
vantage of accelerated depreciation schedules, 0 cash methods of
accounting,"' and extensions of net operating loss carryovers.a2
Each enterprise zone would be in effect for a period of ten years
following its approval by the Secretary of Commerce.2
Section II of this Comment will examine the bases of authority
for the proposed Kemp-Garcia tax abatements and discuss the
constitutional requirements imposed by state and federal uniform-
ity and equal protection clauses. Section III will investigate previ-
ous tax incentives designed to stimulate private enterprise. Section
IV will examine the particulars of the Kemp-Garcia bill itself. Fi-
nally, in section V, recommendations will be offered for considera-
tion of this or any future enterprise zone legislation.
II. Underlying Authority for the Legislation: The
Power to Exempt
The Kemp-Garcia bill would make available several tax incen-
tives to all qualified businesses located in an enterprise zone. 4
Congress would provide most of the incentives by amending the
Internal Revenue Code to provide these businesses with tax abate-
ments, but local governments would also have to do their share by
reducing real property tax rates in the zone.2 5 While the bill is cer-
tainly open to political attack as a plan which would benefit indi-
vidual businesses more than workers from within the community,"
17. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(a)(2). See notes 168-74 infra and ac-
companying text.
18. H.R. 7563, tit. 11A, sec. 201. See notes 188-98 infra and accompanying text.
19. H.R. 7563, tits. IIB-IIC. See notes 199-217 infra and accompanying text.
20. H.R. 7563, tit. 1ID, sec. 231. See notes 218-22 infra and accompanying text.
21. H.R. 7563, tit. lID, sec. 232. See notes 223-25 infra and accompanying text.
22. H.R. 7563, tit. hID, sec. 233. See notes 226-28 infra and accompanying text.
23. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(b)(1). See notes 178-82 infra and ac-
companying text.
24. H.R. 7563, tit. HI. See notes 187-230 infra and accompanying text.
25. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(a)(2). See notes 168-74 infra and ac-
companying text.
26. The Kemp-Garcia bill has already been opposed by New York City Councilman Gil-
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the proposed legislation is far less vulnerable on constitutional
grounds.
The power of a legislature to grant tax abatements stems from
its powers to tax and to exempt.'7 A tax abatement is actually a
partial exemption, although the statutes vary in the language they
use.2 8 Exemptions have often been challenged on constitutional
grounds, particularly under federal and state uniformity and equal
protection clauses.29 The abatements proposed by the Kemp-Gar-
cia bill would similarly be subject to the constitutional standards
which have developed under these clauses.
A. Compliance with the Uniformity Clause
The United States Constitution provides, that "all Duties, Im-
posts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."30 Many state constitutions contain similar uniformity
clauses which apply to certain taxes within the state." In each in-
stance, it is important to examine closely the particular uniformity
clause because its scope and meaning may not be readily apparent.
For example, the uniformity clause in the federal Constitution
must be read in conjunction with several other constitutional pro-
berto Gerenta-Valentin, who in November, 1980, led a group of Bronx residents in picketing
a meeting attended by Representatives Kemp and Garcia and several hundred New York
business executives. The protesters carried signs which read: "Kemp-Garcia means welfare
for the wealthy." To Gerenta-Valentin's charge that the bill was akin to "plantation polit-
ics," Rep. Kemp replied, "[t]hat kind of attack falls of its own merits. This is an effort to
bring business and labor together." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, at A54, col. 1.
27. See, e.g., Mobile and O.R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894), in which the Su-
preme Court sustained a state tax exemption for a particular railroad by recognizing, first,
the legislature's constitutional authority to grant an exemption, and second, "that such ex-
emption might confer either total or partial immunity from taxation, and extend for any
length of time the legislature might deem proper." Id. at 499.
28. Compare, e.g., the Kemp-Garcia bill which speaks in terms of tax "reductions," H.R.
7563, tit. II, with Puerto Rico's Industrial Incentive Act of 1978, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, §
255b, which speaks in terms of "partial exemptions." In each instance, eligible businesses
are not taxed at the full rate.
29. See notes 36-66 infra and accompanying text.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
31. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 9, §§ 2,4 (both property and non-property taxes must be
reasonable and uniform within each class); MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 3 (all taxes, whether or not
imposed on property, must be applied uniformly); N.J. CoNsT. art. 8, § 1, T l(a) ("Property
shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules"); OHIO CONST. art.
XII, §§ 2-3 (unexempted real property must be taxed uniformly; income taxes "may be
either uniform or graduated"); cf. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 16 (article on taxation which contains no
express uniformity clause); CAL. CONST. art. 13 (also without express uniformity clause).
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visions. Sections two and nine of Article I require that direct taxes
be apportioned among the states on the basis of total population.3 2
The language immediately preceding the uniformity clause indi-
cates that while Congress has the authority to lay both direct and
indirect taxes (the latter being those in the form of duties, imposts,
and excises), it is bound by a rule of uniformity only when impos-
ing indirect taxes.33 The distinction prompted the Supreme Court
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.3 4 to conclude, "the
Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect
taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be
governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes,
and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises."38 The
problem for the courts, of course, has always been one of classifica-
tion. The courts have repeatedly labored over the subtle differ-
ences between direct and indirect taxes in order to determine
which rule to apply.36
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 provides: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 provides: "No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken." It is significant that in each clause a specific reference to direct
taxes was made.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 provides in full: "The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." The omission of any reference to "taxes" or
"direct taxes" in the uniformity clause was extensively commented upon by the Supreme
Court as early as 1796 in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1796) ("If there
are any other species of taxes that are not direct, and not included within the words duties,
imposts or excises, they may be laid by the rule of uniformity or not; as congress shall think
proper and reasonable.").
34. 157 U.S. 429, vacated on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
35. Id. at 557.
36. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, vacated on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586 (1880); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). In
each case the Court was called upon to decide whether a particular tax was a direct or an
indirect tax. In Hylton, after ruling that a tax on carriages was an indirect tax because it
was levied on personal property, Justice Chase offered his opinion that the Constitution
contemplated only two types of direct taxes: Capitation or poll taxes (which impose an iden-
tical fee on all individuals subject to the tax) and taxes on land. 3 U.S. at 175. Accordingly,
Soule and Springer held that income taxes were not direct taxes and were not, therefore,
subject to a rule of apportionment. Similarly, taxes imposed by Congress on notes issued by
state banks in Veazie Bank were found to be indirect. In 1895, however, the Supreme Court
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The ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913 added a
new element to the debate. The amendment provided that the rule
of apportionment no longer applied to income taxes;3 7 therefore,
the distinction between direct and indirect taxes insofar as income
taxes were concerned became less important. Immediately, the is-
sue arose of whether the rule of uniformity still applied to income
taxes. Although the amendment had made no mention of uniform-
ity, the Supreme Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad e
held that the rule of uniformity still applied to income taxes.3e
When the federal rule of uniformity applies, it does not require
pursuit of "a baseless dream" of "[p]erfect uniformity and perfect
equality of taxation. '40 The rule does not, for instance, render pro-
gressive income tax schedules void.41 Instead, the rule refers to ge-
ographical uniformity and mandates that a tax "operate generally
throughout the United States. '42 In the case of the Kemp-Garcia
bill, the rule would require that enterprise zone status and the in-
centives which follow be available to every qualified community in
the United States. Undoubtedly some states would benefit more
took a fresh look at the Constitution's tax provisions and held in its first Pollock decision
that a federal income tax was unconstitutional because it taxed income derived from real
property. This amounted to an unapportioned direct tax on real property, in the Court's
view. 157 U.S. at 583. On rehearing, the Court expanded its ruling and held that'even taxes
on personal property or income derived from personal property were direct taxes which
must be apportioned. 158 U.S. at 637. Justice Harlan in his dissent to the decision on re-
hearing asked, "What, in the opinion of this court, was the scope and effect of the decision
in Hylton v. United States?" Id. at 651 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court compounded the
confusion when it later held in Knowlton that an inheritance tax was indirect and subject
only to a rule of uniformity. Congress responded with the sixteenth amendment, which sim-
plifies matters whenever income taxes are involved. See notes 37-39 infra and accompanying
text.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
38. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
39. Id. at 24. The plaintiff in Brushaber was a stockholder who challenged a corporate
income tax imposed by Congress in the wake of the sixteenth amendment. He contended, in
part, that the tax violated the due process, equal protection, and uniformity clauses of the
Constitution. The Court disagreed, and affirmed defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court
cited Knowlton as authority for a correct interpretation of the uniformity clause. Id.
40. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884) (duty imposed on shipowners of 50
cents per immigrant transported to the United States valid under the uniformity clause
even though ships carrying citizens or cargo were not subject to this tax).
41. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929).
42. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. at 96. Knowlton contains a complete discussion of the
meaning of the uniformity rule and credits Madison with the definition that taxes must
"operate generally" throughout the United States. Id. at 83-106.
19811
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than others from the legislation, but that fact alone would be in-
sufficient to constitute a violation of the uniformity rule."' The
Constitution does not require the distribution of uniform benefits
nationwide; it requires the uniform application of federal tax laws.
Uniformity clauses in state constitutions vary, and some states
omit uniformity requirements altogether.4 4 In each state, the prop-
erty tax reduction required of a local government as a prerequisite
for Kemp-Garcia benefits would have to comply with the state's
uniformity rule. An early view held that a uniformity clause in a
state constitution meant that all property within the state must be
taxed if any is to be taxed,45 but modern support for this position
is lacking. The more reasonable approach is to apply the federal
standard and require only that all tax laws apply generally
throughout the state, subject to any exemptions which the legisla-
ture may deem necessary. Most courts have taken this approach. 46
As Justice Cardozo concluded in Williams v. Mayor and City
Council'7 in upholding a special tax exemption in the face of a
43. See generally Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v.
Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (D.R.I. 1978), which focused on Congress' spending power in up-
holding an affirmative action law: "Nor is there any doubt that Congress may pin-point
spending in various localities of intense unemployment and underemployment or that it
may choose to concentrate on urban poverty or rural poverty or that it may attack certain
sources of poverty without challenging others." Id. at 349. Similarly, Congress must be free
to provide tax incentives to businesses located in the poorest neighborhoods so long as those
incentives do not violate the uniformity clause by being totally or partially unavailable to
any qualified community. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 31 supra.
45. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244 (1883); Railroad Cos. v. Gaines,
97 U.S. 697 (1878); City of Savannah v. Weed, 84 Ga. 683, 11 S.E. 235 (1890); Redmond v.
Town of Tarboro, 106 N.C. 122, 10 S.E. 845 (1890). Language in each of these cases would
support a challenge to an exemption under a state uniformity clause. In Gaines, for exam-
ple, the Court held that after Tennessee added a uniformity clause to its constitution, the
legislature could no longer grant tax exemptions to individual railroads. 97 U.S. at 709. No
case has been found, however, which expressly holds that a uniformity clause renders a
legislature totally powerless to exempt.
46. See, e.g., Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 675 (1873)
(Michigan's uniformity clause interpreted to require: "All kinds of property must be taxed
uniformly, or be entirely exempt. The uniformity must be coextensive with the territory to
which the tax applies. If a State tax, it must be uniform all over the State. If a county or
city tax, it must be uniform throughout such county or city." Id.); Wheeler v. Weightman,
96 Kan. 50, 149 P. 977 (1915).
47. 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
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state uniformity clause, "the correcting statute may be as narrow
as the mischief. 4 8
B. Compliance with the Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 4"
would be of little use in challenging the Kemp-Garcia bill. As
noted by Chief Justice Taft in Truax v. Corrigan,50 the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause applies exclusively to state
action.5' Congressional action in providing federal tax incentives
for businesses within enterprise zones could not, therefore, be chal-
lenged under this clause."'
State action in providing real property tax reductions within en-
terprise zones, however, would be subject to the requirements of
both federal and state equal protection clauses. The general rule is
that state legislatures have broad discretion in determining what is
taxable and what is exempt.5 Yet under the fourteenth amend-
48. Id. at 46. Williams involved a Maryland statute which provided a financially crip-
pled railroad with a two year exemption from state, county, and city taxes. The City of
Baltimore challenged the exemption under the uniformity clause in the state constitution.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed that the uniformity rule "does not forbid the
creation of reasonable exemptions in furtherance of the public good." Id. at 41. In relation
to the Kemp-Garcia bill, Williams provides strong support for the validity of local real
property tax reductions despite state uniformity clauses. What Justice Cardozo wrote in
support of the Maryland statute could also be said of enterprise zone legislation: "Further-
ance of the public good is written over the face of this statute from beginning to end as its
animating motive." Id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
51. Id. at 340. In Truax, the Chief Justice compared the histories of the due process and
equal protection clauses. He traced the due process clause from the Magna Carta through
some of the early state constitutions to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. The equal protection clause, on the other hand, did not appear until
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 332. The defendants in Truax argued that if the Court
found a state statute which barred injunctions in most labor disputes unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause, it must also find a similarly worded section in the Clay-
ton Act unconstitutional. The Court disagreed, responding that the equal protection clause
"does not apply to Congressional action but only to state action." Id. at 340.
52. Congressional action could be challenged under the fifth amendment's due process
clause, but the Supreme Court has indicated that the clause cannot restrict reasonable exer-
cise of Congress' taxing power. U.S. v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1953); Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583-85 (1937); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. at 24-26.
53. The Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206 (1873), exemplifies this firmly settled gen-
eral rule. Delaware first exempted and then taxed the capital stock of a railroad which oper-
ated in the state. In upholding the tax the Court wrote, "[i]t has ... been repeatedly held
by this court that the legislature of a State may exempt particular parcels of property or the
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ment's equal protection clause, "[t]ax exemptions are subject to
the limitation that they and the classification upon which they are
based be reasonable, not arbitrary, and apply to all persons simi-
larly situated. 54 In Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,5 the "ra-
tional basis" limitation was employed to invalidate an Ohio statute
which imposed an ad valorem tax on foreign corporations while
exempting domestic corporations.56 The Court held that a state
may not structure a tax schedule solely on the basis of residence in
order to tax the nonresident at a higher rate.5 7
In contrast to Wheeling Steel, Allied Stores v. Bowers"s indi-
cates that a state may grant exemptions primarily on the basis of
residence when public policy factors are also present.59 The Court
property of particular persons or corporations from taxation, either for a specific period or
perpetually, or may limit the amount or rate of taxation, to which such property shall be
subjected." Id. at 225. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), pro-
vides a more recent statement of the rule. Plaintiff corporation argued that a provision in
the Illinois Constitution which imposed a personal property tax on corporations and not on
individuals, ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 5, was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
The Court upheld the tax, stating, "[wihen it comes to taxes on corporations and taxes on
individuals, great leeway is permissible so far as equal protection is concerned." Id. at 360.
54. United States v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Ill.); affd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 21 (1962) (state retailers' occupation tax valid under the limitation even
though it exempted retailers who sold to charities, schools, and churches, but not retailers
who sold to the federal government). The Supreme Court in recent years has given no indi-
cation that it would abandon this "rational basis" test in favor of a "strict scrutiny" test in
an analysis of a tax exemptionstatute. The Court has continually subjected state legislation
in the nature of "local economic regulation" to a rational basis test. Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 17 (1979); Massachdsetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 360 (1973). In fact, the current Court has indicated that the rational basis test may
apply even when the local regulation involves a government agency accused of discrimina-
tory employment practices. In New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979),
plaintiffs were participants in methadone treatment programs who challenged a Transit Au-
thority rule prohibiting the use of all narcotics by Transit Authority employees. Plaintiffs
argued that the rule unfairly discriminated against methadone users, especially the blacks
and Hispanics who constituted approximately two-thirds of those enrolled in public metha-
done treatment programs. Id. at 585. The Court upheld the rule and the Transit Authority's
dismissal of employees participating in the programs. Id. at 594. The Court viewed the rule
as a "policy decision" which, however unwise, was rationally based on a desire by the
Transit Authority to maintain a safe system of public transportation. Id. at 571, 594.
55. 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
56. Id. at 572.
57. Id.
58. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
59. Id. at 528.
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in Allied Stores admitted that it did not know for certain what the
Ohio Legislature intended when it exempted foreign corporations
from a particular ad valorem tax, but because "it is obvious that it
may reasonably have been the purpose" of the legislature to stimu-
late the state's economy, the tax was valid under the equal protec-
tion clause. 0 The actions of a state or local legislature pursuant to
a Kemp-Garcia statute should certainly transcend the confines of
Wheeling Steel and come within the broader reaches of Allied
Stores.
One case decided by the Third Circuit dealt directly with the
issue of whether industrial tax incentives available only to certain
businesses deny other taxpayers equal protection of the laws. In
Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky,6a the court held that the Virgin Is-
lands' industrial incentive program6' did not violate the territory's
equal protection clausea merely because the governor had denied
plaintiff's application for incentives while approving the applica-
tions of plaintiff's competitors." The Third Circuit dismissed
plaintiff's allegation that the governor's decisions were politically
motivated 6 and focused instead on the statute's validity under the
equal protection clause. Because the goal of strengthening the Vir-
gin Islands' economy constituted a rational basis for the legisla-
tion, the statute withstood constitutional challenge."
There is nothing unreasonable or palpably arbitrary about the
proposed Kemp-Garcia legislation which would result in its invali-
dation under an equal protection clause. Certainly some communi-
ties would benefit greatly from the legislation while others faced
60. Id. at 528-29. The Court distinguished Wheeling Steel on the ground that it involved
taxes on foreign corporations levied in response to sister state taxes on Ohio corporations.
The Court concluded that such taxes have no purpose other than to discriminate. Id. at 529-
30. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion offered a cogent analysis of the distinction be-
tween the two cases. He noted that under the federal system, a tax which discriminates
against nonresidents as in Wheeling Steel is far more likely to violate the equal protection
clause as "state action disruptive of the federal pattern" than a tax which discriminates in
favor of nonresidents as in the case before the Court. Id. at 533 (Brennan, J. concurring).
61. 384 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968).
62. See notes 130-38 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of the Virgin Islands'
program.
63. Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, Pub. L. No. 83-517, § 3, 68 Stat. 497
(1954) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (1976)).
64. Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 384 F.2d at 586.
65. Id. at 585-86.
66. Id. at 586.
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with economic hardship would not even qualify for assistance."7
Courts have indicated, however, that neither the equal protection
nor uniformity clauses will be of much assistance in challenging
the broad powers of a legislature to tax, exempt, and provide
incentives.
III. Forerunners to the Legislation: Previous Tax Incen-
tives Designed to Stimulate Private Enterprise
A. Early Incentives
Tax incentives have been used in the United States to accelerate
economic growth since the early days of the Republic." In the
nineteenth century, legislatures commonly exempted railroads
from taxation in order to ensure the speedy construction of rail
lines within their states. Banks, representing another important
factor in the economic growth of a state, were also frequent benefi-
ciaries of the exemptions and abatements.7 0 The terms of the vari-
ous exemptions differed, reflecting the specific designs of the legis-
latures drafting them. Some exemptions were intended to assist
new companies in their infancy and were therefore valid for only a
limited number of years.7 1 Some exemptions were total;71 others
67. Enterprise zone status would not be available, for example, to an area with a popula-
tion of less than 4,000 persons (unless the area were also an Indian reservation). H.R. 7563,
tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(c)(1)(C). Even a larger area suddenly hit with high unem-
ployment would not qualify until two years had passed and complete unemployment figures
could be compiled. Id. § 7871(c)(1)(2). See notes 154-86 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of how zones would be designated under the Kemp-Garcia bill.
68. The Supreme Court in Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1871),
traced the use of tax incentives in North Carolina to a 1790 exemption incorporated in the
charter of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company. Id. at 265.
69. Often legislatures were silent as to their reasons for exempting railroads. In certain
instances, however, states manifested a desire to become or remain competitive with other
states' systems of transportation. Florida in 1855, for example, passed "An Act to Provide
for and Encourage a Liberal System of Internal Improvements in this State" which stated,
in part, that "the capital stock of any railroad company accepting the provisions of this act
shall be forever exempt from taxation. . . ." 1855 Fla. Laws ch. 610, § 18, reprinted in part
in Atlantic and Gulf R.R. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637, 659 (1876).
70. See, e.g., Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 134, 135, modified, 163 U.S. 416
(1896) (bank agreed to pay annual tax of one half percent on each share of capital stock in
lieu of all other taxes); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 445 (1861)
(bank permitted to pay six percent on its annual dividends in lieu of all other taxes).
71. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia R.R. and Banking Co., 216 U.S. 420, 422 (1910) (railroad
stock exempt for seven years after completion of the railroad, but then subject to a tax on
net proceeds); Mobile and 0. R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 488 (1894) (railroad's fixed
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were partial." Usually exemptions were written into the charters
of specific companies;74 occasionally they were enacted into stat-
utes and applied generally to all qualified businesses throughout
the state."
The most troublesome variety of the early tax incentives was the
perpetual exemption. Businesses lobbied for these exemptions be-
cause, as the Supreme Court once explained, "[a] more important
or more comprehensive privilege than a perpetual immunity from
taxation can scarcely be imagined." 76 State legislatures were not
adverse to granting perpetual exemptions, especially during peri-
ods of growth and industrialization such as the mid-nineteenth
century.7 The problem arose years later when subsequent legisla-
tures reconsidered the exemptions and attempted to impose new
assets exempt for 25 years after completion of the railroad, with a ceiling on taxes
thereafter).
72. Railroads were usually able to secure total exemptions, which meant that they paid
no taxes during the life of the exemption. See, e.g., Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 264 (1871); cf. Mobile and O.R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 488 (1894) (railroad was
the recipient of a perpetual total exemption on capital stock, a limited (for twenty-five
years) total exemption on fixed assets, and a perpetual partial exemption on fixed assets
after the twenty-five years had passed ("no tax shall ever be laid on said road or its fixtures
which will reduce the dividends below eight per cent." Id.)).
73. Banks were often able to secure only partial exemptions or tax abatements. See, e.g.,
note 70 supra and cases cited therein; Shelby County v. Union and Planters' Bank, 161 U.S.
149 (1896) (capital stock in possession of shareholders, subject to partial exemption whereby
tax could not exceed one half percent per share, but capital stock in possession of bank
subject to full taxation).
74. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia R.R. and Banking, 216 U.S. 420, 422 (1910) (Georgia
legislature chartered railroad with express exemption in 1833); Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1871) (North Carolina legislature chartered railroad in 1853 and pro-
vided in the charter that "the property of said company and the shares therein shall be
exempt from any public charge or tax whatsoever."Id.).
75. See, e.g., State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 377 (1853) (Ohio Legislature
passed a general banking law in 1845 which provided that any bank incorporated pursuant
to the statute would pay, in lieu of all other taxes, six percent on semiannual dividends);
Atlantic and Gulf R.R. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637, 659 (1876). See also note 69 supra.
76. Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244, 247 (1872).
77. In Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1871), the Court noted that
eighteen years earlier the North Carolina Legislature had entered into a contract which met
the needs of the state at that time: "The General Assembly of North Carolina told the
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, in language which no one can misunderstand,
that if they would complete the work of internal improvement for which they were incorpo-
rated, their property and the shares of their stockholders should be forever exempt from
taxation." Id. at 267. The Court would not allow the state to breach the contract after the
improvements were made. Id.
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taxes. Many businesses confronted with this unexpected tax liabil-
ity successfully argued that the new taxes impaired the obligation
of a contract they had with the state.78 The court would uphold the
new taxes, however, if the exemption had never been more than a
gratuity conferred by the legislature.7 9 This distinction between
binding and non-binding perpetual exemptions may prove to be an
important one under the Kemp-Garcia bill, which calls for the en-
actment of permanent real property tax reductions in areas desig-
nated as enterprise zones.80
B. Development of Targeted Incentives
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, state and local legis-
latures began granting fewer charter exemptions for the benefit of
individual companies and more statutory exemptions for the bene-
fit of all those qualified. When New York imposed a capital stock
tax on corporations in 1880, for example, it expressly exempted
banks, insurance companies, and "manufacturing corporations car-
rying on-manufacture within this State."81 The reason for exempt-
ing manufacturers, according to one New York court, was "the de-
sire on the part of the State to bring within its borders the
advantages which attend the maintaining of large manufacturing
establishments and the employment of many men therein."8
Pennsylvania, mindful of the incentives available in New York,
78. Id.; Wright v. Georgia R.R. and Banking, 216 U.S. 420, 422 (1910) (holding that a
new tax imposed by the Georgia Legislature applied only to property acquired by a railroad
after its charter exemption; the state conceded that "the charter constitutes a contract
which may not be impaired by subsequent legislation." Id.); Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861).
79. West Wis. Ry. v. Board of Supervisors, 93 U.S. 595 (1876); Tucker v. Ferguson, 89
U.S. (22 Wall.) 527 (1874). In each case, the Court held that there had never been a contract
between the legislature and the exempted company which would prevent the withdrawal of
the exemption. As the Court pointed out in West Wisconsin Railway, "[tihe State asked for
no promise from the company, and the company gave none." 93 U.S. at 598. A later decision
emphasized that in neither case was the exemption expressed in the company's charter.
Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U.S. 362, 368 (1881) (perpetual exemption written in the char-
ter of a charitable institution upheld).
80. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(d)(1). See notes 168-74 infra and ac-
companying text for an analysis of this provision.
81. Act of June 1, 1880, ch. 542, § 3, 1880 N.Y. Laws 763 (amended 1890).
82. People ex rel. Blackington Co. v. Roberts, 4 A.D. 388, 390 (3d Dep't 1896), aff'd, 151
N.Y. 652, 46 N.E. 1150 (1897) (company which manufactured textiles in Massachusetts and
sold them in New York not entitled to the exemption).
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provided manufacturers with a similar exemption from its capital
stock tax in 1885.88 Exemptions such as these, aimed at specific
industries and regions, were the ideological predecessors of the en-
terprise zone.
The problem which arose with exemptions written for particular
industries was the continuing need to define the statute to decide
which companies were exempt. An ordinance in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, for example, exempted "manufacturing establishments"
from all city taxes for a period of five years "in order to induce the
location of more manufacturing establishments within the
city. . ."8 A Louisville company which made men's suits to the
specifications of local dealers requested the exemption. The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky, after consulting dictionaries, statutes and
cases, held that the business was not entitled to the exemption,
primarily because a line had to be drawn somewhere or every busi-
ness in the city would be exempt.a5 Other courts over the years
have ruled that utilities," scrap metal recyclers, '7 and makers of
popcorn for theaterss were not manufacturers for the purposes of
an exemption. The Kemp-Garcia bill avoids this problem of defin-
ing types of industries by providing tax incentives to all qualified
businesses located in an enterprise zone.8
83. Further Supplement of June 30, 1885, no. 162, § 20, 1885 Pa. Laws 193 (amending
1879 Pa. Laws 112) (amended 1889). In Commonwealth v. Northern Elec. Light & Power
Co., 145 Pa. 105, 22 A. 839 (1891), the court stated,
When the act of 1885 was passed, laws had been made in adjoining states which gave
encouragement to the establishment of factories by exempting them from certain
forms of taxation. The mischief to be remedied was the danger that such legislation
might lead to the removal of capital and labor from this state to others, to the detri-
ment of the business and prosperity of our own.
Id. at 120, 22 A. at 841.
84. LouisvnLz, Ky., ORDINANCE, reprinted in part in Standard Tailoring Co. v. Louis-
ville, 152 Ky. 504, 505, 153 S.W. 764, 765 (1913).
85. 152 Ky. at 509-10, 153 S.W. at 767. The court feared that if appellants "tailors to the
trade" were granted an exemption, then all tailors and dressmakers would demand an ex-
emption, followed by all shoemakers, all carpenters, etc. Id. Whether or not the case was
correctly decided, it does illustrate the kind of problem this type of statute creates.
86. Frederick Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Mayor of Frederick City, 84 Md. 599, 36 A. 362
(1897); Williams v. Park, 72 N.H. 305, 56 A. 463 (1903). Contra, Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156
S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865 (1930).
87. Commonwealth v. Deitch Co., 449 Pa. 88, 295 A.2d 834 (1972).
88. Commonwealth v. Berlo Vending Co., 415 Pa. 101, 202 A.2d 94 (1964).
89. The Kemp-Garcia bill does not entirely avoid the problem, though. By offering in-
centives only to "qualified" businesses in a zone, the bill may give rise to litigation on the
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Legislatures continued to use targeted tax incentives, when nec-
essary, in the early part of the twentieth century. The South was
especially active during the first three decades in its attempts to
revive specific areas of its slumping economy. Arkansas, for in-
stance, amended its constitution in 1926 to provide a seven year
exemption for all capital invested in cotton mills.90 Alabama, hop-
ing to encourage "the building, extending and operating of facto-
ries," enacted a statute in 1927 which exempted factories from all
county and municipal taxes for a period of five years;e1 Georgia
had amended its constitution three years earlier to include a simi-
lar provision." South Carolina in 1925 enacted a statute which,
like the Kemp-Garcia plan, offered tax incentives only to those
businesses located in certain areas.' 3
The use of targeted incentives in the early part of the century
extended beyond those exemptions intended to lure manufacturers
to particular states or cities. When New York State, and especially
New York City, experienced a serious housing shortage following
the end of the first world war, the state legislature responded by
passing a series of laws intended to encourage new construction."
The principal statute provided that local governments could ex-
issue of whether individual businesses are qualified. For an analysis of what constitutes a
qualified business under the bill, see notes 200-07 infra and accompanying text.
90. ARK. CONST. amend. 12, § 1. The amendment, still in effect, allows an exemption "for
a period of seven years from the date of the location of said textile mill." Id. The amend-
ment was upheld under the equal protection clause in Wilson v. Monticello Cotton Mills
Co., 180 Ark. 1090, 24 S.W.2d 324 (1930) (cotton mill entitled to refund of taxes unlawfully
collected by county).
91. Act of Sept. 6, 1927, no. 559, § 1, 1927 Ala. Acts 641. The act survived a challenge on
state constitutional grounds that it conflicted with a special school tax amendment, ALA.
CONST. amend. 19, §§ 1, 2, in Pullman Car & Mfg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 229 Ala. 74, 155 So.
616 (1934), afl'd on rehearing, 230 Ala. 688, 163 So. 329 (1935).
92. GA. CONST. of 1877, art. 7, § 2, para. 2 (1924) (repealed 1976).
93. Act of March 5, 1925, no. 468, 1925 S.C. Acts 891. Section 1 of the act provided:
"Any and all manufactories desiring to locate in [one of eleven specified counties] with a
capital of not less than one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) dollars shall be exempt from all
county taxes, except for school purposes, for the five (5) years from the time of their estab-
lishment." Id. An interesting problem arose when a power company located on the "taxable"
side of a river decided to build its new plant on the "exempt" side of the river. The court in
Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865 (1930), permitted the exemption.
94. Acts of Sept. 27, 1920, chs. 942-953, 1920 N.Y. Laws 2477 (amended 1921). For a
thorough account of the housing shortage and state and local efforts to overcome it, see
SPECIAL CoMMrrrI ON TAX POLICIES, How TAx EXEMPTION BROKE THE HOUSING DEADLOCK
IN Nsw YORK Crrv (May 1960) [hereinafter cited as SpEcIAL COMMITTEE ON TAX POLICIES).
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empt all new buildings "planned for dwelling purposes," except ho-
tels, from local taxation." New York City agreed to offer the ex-
emptions for a period of ten years,"6 and several other communities
in the state followed suit.97 The statutes withstood a court chal-
lenge" and successfully alleviated the housing shortage."
Several states found new cause to pass targeted tax incentive
laws during the Depression. In 1936, when the Mississippi legisla-
ture chose to exempt for five years many new factories from all ad
valorem taxes, its express purpose was to provide relief from "an
acute, economic emergency." 100 Massachusetts enacted a statute
that same year which imposed, in lieu of all local taxes, lower state
taxes on machinery used by manufacturers.' 0 ' Also in 1936, Louisi-
ana amended its constitution to provide a State Board of Coin-
95. Act of Sept. 27, 1920, ch. 949, § 1, 1920 N.Y. Laws 2487 (amended 1921).
96. New York, N.Y., Ordinance 112 (Feb. 15, 1921), reprinted in Hermitage Co. v. Gold-
fogle, 204 A.D. 710, 719, 199 N.Y.S. 382 (1st Dep't 1923). The ordinance limited the exemp-
tions to approximately $1000 per room, depending on the type of dwelling. Because the
ordinance also put a time constraint on the exemptions by providing a fixed termination
date of January 1, 1932, the incentives most benefited those builders who acted quickly.
97. See SPECIAL COMMITz ON TAX POLICIES, supra note 94, at 3-32.
98. Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle, 204 A.D. 710, 199 N.Y.S. 382 (1st Dep't 1923). The court
ruled that neither the state statute nor the city ordinance was unconstitutional. Using lan-
guage which could apply as well to enterprise zone legislation, the court wrote that the ex-
emption "was a bargain between the State and the owner of vacant property, by which no
one was the loser. The State gained additional housing facilities for its citizens, the owner
gained an exemption from local taxes, the locality gained improved real estate subject to
taxation when the period of exemption should expire." Id. at 727.
99. See SPECIAL* COMMITTEE ON TAX POLICIES, supra note 94, at 1-9 to -10. This study
concluded that the incentives produced a "building boom" which began in 1921 and intensi-
fied over the next four years. Id. at 1-9. For an analysis of tax incentives currently available
to encourage new housing in New York City, see Griffith, Revitalization of Inner City Hous-
ing Through Property Tax Exemption and Abatement: New York City's J-51 to the Res-
cue, 18 URB. L. ANN. 153 (1980).
100. Balance Agriculture with Industry Act, ch. 1, Preamble, § 19, 1936 Miss. Laws 1st
Extr. Sess. 5 (amended 1936). The legislature noted that the emergency had "decreased
Mississippi's industrial enterprises so that many of her citizens are on relief and are leaving
the state .. " Id. Preamble. Therefore, every new factory "of public utility" could take
advantage of the exemption. Id. § 19. Even the word "new" was to be construed liberally.
When a shirt manufacturing company began operating at an idle factory site, for example,
the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the company was entitled to the exemption. Mea-
dor v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 188 Miss. 98, 191 So. 129 (1939).
101. Act of June 16, 1936, ch. 362, § 5, 1936 Mass. Acts 444 (amended 1937). The court
in Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation v. Assessors of Boston, 321 Mass. 90, 71 N.E.2d 874
(1947) indicated that the object of the lower tax was to check a decline in manufacturing in
the state. Id. at 95-96, 71 N.E.2d at 878-79.
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merce and Industry with the authority to exempt new or ex-
panding industries from all state taxes for a period of up to ten
years.10
2
Since the Depression, most of the nation has participated in an
era of growth which has lessened the need for incentives aimed at
specific industries and regions. Two important incentive programs
were developed in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands after the
Second World War. 10' In the 1950's and 60's, some states supple-
mented their urban renewal programs with tax incentives in order
to enlist the aid of private enterprise;1 0 4 however, the number of
specific tax incentives granted by a legislature to bring specific in-
dustries into an area have levelled off in recent years.10 6 If there is
a trend to be found in the history of these incentives, it is simply
that they appear less often when times are good than when times
are bad. For those who would agree that times have never been
worse for many of the nation's cities, the appearance of the Kemp-
Garcia bill should come as no surprise.
102. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. X, § 4 (1936) (current version at LA. CONsT., art. 7, § 21(F)).
The amendment gave the Board wide discretion in making contracts in the best interests of
the state. In one instance, a new industry which was denied an exemption brought suit
seeking to compel the Board to grant the exemption. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that absent an abuse of discretion, the Board was free to grant exemptions as it saw fit.
State ex rel. Kohler's Snowite Laundry & Cleaners, Inc. v. State Bd. of Commerce and In-
dus., 205 La. 622, 17 So. 2d 899 (1944).
103. See notes 116-38 infra and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., 2 Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.110 (1959) (privately held urban redevelopment
corporations exempt from general ad valorem taxes for ten years). The Missouri statute was
challenged and held constitutional in Annbar Assocs. v. West Side Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d
635 (1965), appeal dismissed for want of a federal question, 385 U.S. 5 (1966); OMO REv.
CODE ANN. § 725.02 (Page) (1976) (all improvements to real property in an urban renewal
area are exempt from real property taxes so long as urban renewal bonds for the area are
outstanding).
105. Two federal programs offer a limited number of incentives in the form of grants
and loans to qualified regions and businesses. The Small Business Administration is author-
ized to make loans 9f up to $100,000 to certain "small business concerns located in urban or
rural areas with high proportions of unemployed or low-income individuals, or owned by
low-income individuals ... " 15 U.S.C. § 636(i)(1) (Supp. III 1979). A Housing and Urban
Development program provides Urban Development Action Grants ("UDAG grants") to
"severely distressed cities and urban counties" which have formulated detailed renewal
plans. 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. III 1979). Proponents of enterprise zones argue that the SBA
and HUD programs are overly bureaucratic and generally unresponsive to high-risk projects.
See, e.g., S. BuTLER, supra note 5, at 10-12.
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C. The Kennedy Proposal of 1967
When Senator Robert Kennedy introduced a bill to create the
Urban Employment Opportunities Development Act of 1967,106 he
stated, "the specific purpose of the bill is to stimulate invest-
ment-the creation of new jobs and income-in poverty areas. '107
Kennedy reminded the Senate that his tax incentive proposals
would require "no great new outflows of Government spending"
but would encourage the private sector to bring jobs'to urban pov-
erty areas.'0 8 The Kennedy bill, like the Kemp-Garcia bill, pro-
posed offering tax incentives for a period of ten years to qualified
businesses located in economically depressed areas.'10 Kennedy's
definition of a qualified business, however, was a narrow one. For a
business to obtain a "Certificate of Eligibility" it had to be "an
industrial or commercial enterprise" employing at least fifty people
on a full time basis."10 Retail stores were excluded from the pro-
gram,"' as were businesses relocating from other areas.' 1 Addi-
106. S. 2088, 90th Cong., 1st Seas., 113 CONG. REC. 18450 (1967).
107. 113 CONG. REc. 18443 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Robert Kennedy). There is little dif-
ference between the language used by the supporters of the Kennedy bill in 1967 and that
used by the supporters of the Kemp-Garcia bill today. For instance, Senator Kennedy
stated, "After extensive consultation with representatives of business, labor, government,
the academic community, and the urban poor themselves, our expectation is that these in-
centives will give our private enterprise system-the most ingenious and productive the
world has ever known-the help it needs to effectively attack the difficult and resistant
problems of urban unemployment." 113 CONG. REC. 18443. By comparison, Representative
Garcia recently stated, "[t]he key to area-wide redevelopment is opportunity develop-
ment-or, more precisely, the reestablishment of opportunity producing incentives in areas
where they no longer exist. . . ." 126 CONG. REc. E3880 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1980).
108. 113 CONG. REC. 18443.
109. S. 2088, 90th Cong., 1st Seas., tits. I-II. Specifically, the Kennedy bill would have
provided the following incentives in urban poverty areas: a seven percent tax credit on busi-
ness expenditures for real property, a 10% credit on business expenditures for personal
property, a one-third useful life reduction on most property, an extension of net operation
loss carryovers from five to ten years, and a deduction of 25% of the salaries paid to certain
workers hired under the program. Id. tit. II.
110. Id. tit. I, § 101(a)(3)(B). Under an exception applicable only to Indian reservations
and qualified urban areas with populations of less than 50,000 persons, businesses could
employ twenty-five full-time employees and still be eligible for the incentives. Both the rule
and exception, however, required that two-thirds of all employees be either residents of the
poverty area for at least six months or unemployed before their present jobs. Id.
111. Id. § 3(5)(E).
112. Id. § 2. This provision, although it discourages the creation of some jobs in poor
neighborhoods, is worth noting. One argument against the creation of enterprise zones is
that they will merely "rob Peter to pay Paul." See S. BUTLER, supra note 5, at 33. A provi-
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tionally, few areas outside the impoverished neighborhoods of large
cities were eligible to receive the incentives." ' Although the bill
received bilateral support when it was introduced," ' it never
emerged from the Senate Finance Committee."15
D. Industrial Incentive Programs in Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands
When Senator Kennedy introduced his bill in 1967, he noted the
two decades of success achieved by an industrial incentive program
in Puerto Rico.1' 6 Puerto Rico passed its first Industrial Tax Ex-
emption Act in 1948."7 As part of the government's "Operation
Bootstrap" program,"" the act was designed to encourage indus-
trial growth in Puerto Rico at a time when agriculture was the
mainstay of the economy." 9
Under the present Puerto Rican program,'2 0 the governor grants
sion which would deny incentives to businesses which close shop in one part of a city to
reopen in a neighboring enterprise zone may be a desirable addition to the Kemp-Garcia
bill.
113. S. 2088, § 3(2). The bill applied primarily to federally designated poverty areas in
metropolitan regions with populations of 250,000 or more. The Bureau of the Census
counted 193 such areas in 37 states. 113 CONG. Rzc. 18446 (remarks of Sen. Robert Ken-
nedy). The bill also provided that the federal government could make special designations
and bring smaller cities and Indian reservations into the program. S. 2088, § 3(2).
114. Among the Senators who co-sponsored the Kennedy bill were Mondale, Javits, Pell,
Inouye, Hart, Magnuson, Tydings, Ribicoff, and Bayh. 113 CONG. Rac. 18457 (1967).
115. The Kennedy bill at least succeeded in alerting Congress to the possibility of using
tax incentives to encourage urban redevelopment. Rep. Kemp was familiar with the Ken-
nedy bill when he drafted his legislation. Letter from Rep. Jack Kemp to author (Oct. 28,
1980) (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal).
116. 113 CONG. REc. 18445 (1967).
117. Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1948, No. 184, 1948 P.R. Laws 482 (superceded
1954).
118. Puerto Rico began the informal program, now known as "Operation Liftoff," in the
early 1940's in an effort to promote all sectors of its economy. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., TAX
AND TRADE GUIDE: PUERTO RICo 111 (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ARTHUR ANDERSEN].
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Industrial Incentive Act of 1978, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 13, § 255 (Supp. 1979). The
1948 Act was superceded by similar acts passed in 1954, Industrial Incentive Act of 1954,
No. 6; 1953 P.R. Laws 12 (superceded 1963), and in 1963, Industrial Incentive Act of 1963,
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 252 (1978) (superceded 1978). The 1948 and 1954 Acts are ex-
amined in Mihaly, Tax Advantages of Doing Business in Puerto Rico, 16 STAN. L. REv. 75
(1963). The 1963 Act is examined in ARTHUR ANDERSEN, supra note 118, at 113-26; Mihaly,
Recent Developments Affecting Taxation of Business Operations in Puerto Rico, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 823 (1966).
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exemptions to businesses on an individual basis. 121 Applicants are
screened carefully to make certain that each exemption will serve
the best interests of the commonwealth. 2 2 Only certain types of
businesses may apply, but among those eligible are industrial
units, 2 a tourist hotels,124 and designated services.2 5 Once the gov-
ernor approves a designation, the business is entitled to a series of
partial exemptions which decrease in value over the years." 6 The
exact number of years that a business will enjoy its exemptions
depends on its location. Puerto Rico is divided into four categories
121. Act of 1978, § 255a(c) (Supp. 1979).
122. Id. § 255h(a). The section provides that the governor may refuse to grant an exemp-
tion to any business, if in his judgment the exemption would not "serve the best social and
economic interests of the People of Puerto Rico." Id. In Everlasting Dev. Corp. v. Descartes,
192 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1951), plaintiff building corporation sought declaratory relief after the
tax exemption council and the governor had rejected its application. The 1948 Act, like the
current law, required the council and the governor to consider many factors when ruling on
an application. Act of 1948, § 2. The court denied relief, refusing to interfere with "a judg-
ment . . . political in nature rather than judicial." 192 F.2d at 6.
123. Act of 1978, §§ 255a(d)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1979).
124. Id. § 255a(d)(7). A tourist hotel is defined as a hotel which caters to the tourist
trade by offering beaches, swimming pools, court games, etc. Id. § 255a(f)(1). To be distin-
guished are commercial hotels, defined as all other hotels under the 1963 Act. Act of 1963, §
252a(f)(2). A comparison of the two acts reveals how incentives change to meet the needs of
the times. Under the 1963 Act, all tourist hotels, commercial hotels, and guest houses could
apply for exemptions. Id. §§ 252a(d)(5)-252a(d)(6). Under the current law, only tourist ho-
tels which were closed or under construction on January 1, 1978 may apply. Act of 1978, §
255a(d)(7) (Supp. 1979).
125. Act of 1978, § 255a(d)(9) (Supp. 1979). Among the services which may apply for
exemptions are banks, consulting firms, mail order houses, computer service centers, and
medical laboratories. Id. § 255a(o). Because the prior acts emphasized industrial develop-
ment, most services could not apply for exemptions until the enactment of the current stat-
ute. The legislature wrote the new law to "generate a substantial number of well-remuner-
ated jobs in addition to those created in the manufacturing phase." Industrial Incentive Act
of 1978, No. 26, 1978 P.R. Laws 55, 57.
126. The 1978 Act is the first act which emphasizes partial, rather than total, exemp-
tions for eligible businesses. Act of 1978, § 255b (Supp. 1979); cf. Act of 1963, § 250. The
primary incentives available to most businesses are partial exemptions from industrial de-
velopment income, personal property, and real property taxes, and total exemptions from
license fees, local excise taxes, and other municipal taxes. Act of 1978, §§ 255b(a)-(c) (Supp.
1979). When the partial exemptions apply, most businesses are entitled to a 90% exemption
for the first five years, a 75% exemption for the next five years, a 65% exemption for the
next five years (if the exemption is for more than ten years), a 55% exemption for the next
five years, and a 50% exemption for the final five years. Id. §§ 255b(a)-(b). The rule is
different for service units. They are entitled to partial exemptions from the same taxes, but
at the lesser rate of 50% for the entire period of exemption. Id. § 225b(o). Service units are
entitled to the same total exemptions as other businesses. Id.
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of zones, with exemptions available for ten years in Zone I areas
and twenty-five years in Zone IV areas. 127 Certain industries may
find the 1978 Act less attractive than its predecessors, but the act
was designed to achieve "a public policy for development which is
totally integrated to the social, economic, ecological and fiscal
needs of our Government."'1 8 Nonetheless, the results of thirty
years of industrial incentive' laws in Puerto Rico have been
impressive. 1 9
The United States Virgin Islands enacted its first Industrial In-
centive Program in 1957.180 The current law"' provides that indi-
vidual businesses must apply to the Industrial Development Com-
mission to receive the benefits of the program.1 82 To be eligible, a
business must make an investment of at least $50,000 exclusive of
inventory, employ at least ten Virgin Islands residents on a full
time basis, and agree to purchase all reasonably priced goods and
services from native firms.133 Like the Puerto Rican program, the
statute allows its Commission to exercise broad discretion in decid-
ing which applications to approve.13 4 When an application is ap-
127. Id. § 255bid)(1). Exemptions are available in a Zone I area, one of "high industrial
development," for ten years; a Zone II area, one of "intermediate industrial development,"
for 15 years; a Zone III area, one of "low industrial development," for 20 years; and a Zone
IV area, the islands of Vieques or Culebra, for 25 years. Id.
128. 1978 P.R. Laws 26.
129. According to ARTHUR ANDERSEN, supra note 118, industrialization proceeded at a
rapid pace after the Act of 1948, with the Gross national product increasing fourfold in 15
years. Id. at 111-12.
130. Industrial Incentive Program, No. 224, 1957 V.I. Laws 146 (superceded 1961). The
statute was held constitutional in Port Constr. Co. v. Virgin Islands, 359 F.2d 663 (3d Cir.
1966) (no denial of equal protection because the incentives were available only to businesses
organized under Virgin Islands law).
131. Industrial Development Program, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 701-725 (Supp. 1979).
The 1957 program was superceded by statutes enacted in 1961, Industrial Incentive Pro-
gram, No. 798, 1961 V.I. Laws 251 (superceded 1972), and in 1972, Investment Incentive
Program, No. 3263, 1972 V.I. Laws 195 (superceded 1975).
132. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 705(a) (Supp. 1979).
133. Id. § 708. Businesses are also required to incorporate under Virgin Islands or
United States law, meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 934 (relating to income tax exemptions
for certain Virgin Islands residents and corporations), qualify as actual investors, comply
with all federal and local laws, and grant the government a perpetual easement across any
land adjoining a beach or shoreline. Id.
134. Id. § 709. See King Christian Enterprises v. Virgin Islands, 345 F.2d 633 (3d Cir.
1965) (building company not entitled to exemption; Tax Exemption Board acted properly
when it refused to treat several of plaintiff'a investments together for purposes of meeting
the statute's requirement of minimum capital).
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proved, the government issues a certificate in the nature of a con-
tract 8 which entitles the business to a series of tax exemptions
and subsidies." 6 The business, at its option, may choose to receive
its benefits in as few as ten years or in as many as twenty years. 1 "7
Benefits for an additional five to ten years are available to those
businesses which locate in specified "economically depressed"
areas.1' 8
E. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
Congress, as part of the Revenue Act of 1978,9 amended the
Internal Revenue Code to provide a targeted jobs tax credit to em-
ployers of qualified workers.140 The credit, which will remain in ef-
fect through the end of 1981,4 seeks "to focus employment incen-
tives on those individuals who have high unemployment rates,
even when the national unemployment rate is low. .... *,', Accord-
ingly, the Code lists seven groups of individuals, including the eco-
nomically disadvantaged and the handicapped, who stand to bene-
fit from the credit. 148 Employers who hire members of these
targeted groups may claim tax credits as follows: fifty percent of
135. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 701(c) (Supp. 1979). In Vitex Mfg. Co. v. Virgin Islands,
351 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1965), the court ruled that because the certificate was in the nature of
a contract, the language of the certificate should be construed against the government.
136. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 713-715 (Supp. 1979). Eligible businesses receive exemp-
tions from most real property, gross recepits, and excise taxes. Id. § 713(a). They also re-
ceive non-taxable subsidies, or rebates, of 90% of most income taxes paid to the Virgin
Islands, and 90% of customs duties and other taxes paid on imported raw materials and
component parts. Id. § 713(b).
137. Id. § 713(c). Businesses which elect a ten year period of benefits receive total ex-
emptions and 90% subsidies annually. Those which elect a twenty year term receive 50%
exemptions and 45% subsidies annually. A business may choose to receive its benefits for
any number of years in between the two poles, with rates adjusted accordingly. Id.
138. Id. § 714(a).
139. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of I.R.C.)
140. I.R.C. §§ 51-53.
141. Id. § 51(c)(4).
142. S. Rep. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sesa. 126, reprinted in [1978] U. S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6761, 6889.
143. I.R.C. § 51(d)(1) provides, "An individual is a member of a targeted group if such
individual is-(A) a vocational rehabilitation referral, (B) an economically disadvantaged
youth, (C) an economically disadvantaged Vietnam-era veteran, (D) an SSI recipient, (E) a
general assistance recipient, (F) a youth participating in a cooperative education program,
or (G) an economically disadvantaged ex-convict." The categories are further defined in §4
51(d)(2)-(9).
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the first $6,000 of wages paid to the employee during the first year
of his employment, and twenty-five percent of the first $6,000 of
wages paid during the second year.4 4 Thus an employer receives a
maximum credit of $4,500 per qualified employee over a two year
period.
The credit, while it identifies targeted groups of individuals in
need of jobs, fails to encourage the creation of jobs where they are
most needed. The Kemp-Garcia plan seems preferable to the
amended Internal Revenue Code. It proposes to bring jobs to many
of the same groups, but plans to do so by creating the jobs, with as
little red tape as possible, in the targeted areas. Under the current
law, a young person who seeks employment as an "economically
disadvantaged youth" must first prove to the satisfaction of a
"designated local agency" that he is a member of a family whose
income for the past six months has been less than seventy percent
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics "lower living standard."" 5 On the
other hand, under the Kemp-Garcia bill, he would only have to
prove that he resides in the zone to ensure that he and his em-
ployer would enjoy the full benefits of the legislation."46
F. Current Enterprise Zones In Great Britain
Enterprise zones are currently being developed in at least seven
communities in Great Britain.'4 7 The British program received a
boost in 1979 with the appointment of Sir Geoffrey Howe, one of
the originators of the enterprise zone concept, to the influential
post of Chancellor of the Exchequer.'4 The British program offers
several major incentives to businesses willing to locate in a zone.
For instance, every business in a zone receives an exemption from
all real property and corporate income taxes.14 9 The government
144. Id. §§ 51(a)-(b).
145. Id. § 51(d)(3), (9).
146. Employers who hire up to half of their workers from areas outside a zone may still
be eligible for Kemp-Garcia benefits. H.R. 7563, tit. IIA, sec. 211(d)(2)(C). See notes 200-07
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the eligibility requirements under the
Kemp-Garcia bill.
147. Dep't of the Environment, Press Release No. 51 (July 29, 1980) (Great Britain].
The sites for the zones, limited to approximately 500 acres each, include parts of London,
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, and Belfast. See also Unsworth, UK Eyes Setting Up 7
'Enterprise Zones,' J. Com., Oct. 29, 1980, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
148. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text for a summary of Sir Geoffrey's plan.
149. Dep't of the Treasury, Economic Progress Report, No. 121 (May 1980) [Great
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has eased zoning restrictions and made planning procedures less
complicated.5 o It has also promised to "reduce to a bare minimum
its requests for statistical information" from zone businesses. " '
The British zones are slated to run for ten years, subject to re-
newal.152 While the government's ultimate aim is to "bring new life
back to these areas of economic dereliction," 8 it is still too early
to gauge the success of the program. In conjunction with the
Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands' programs, however, the British
zones provide Congress with useful models for enterprise zones in
America.
IV. Analysis of the Kemp-Garcia Bill
A. Designation of Zones 1"
Under the Kemp-Garcia bill, local governments take the first
step in deciding which areas should be designated as enterprise
zones by submitting their applications to the Secretary of Com-
merce.'55 Alternatively, a state government may apply on behalf of
one or more consenting local governments." In instances in which
the boundaries of an enterprise zone will extend beyond the juris-
diction of a single city or town, the second option may prove espe-
cially useful because it allows the state to take the initiative in
seeking a designation. Under both options, however, a local govern-
ment has the final word on whether or not an application will be
submitted. As a result, no community will be saddled with an en-
terprise zone it never requested.
An applicant must meet several requirements in order to qualify
for enterprise zone status. First, the entire area of the zone must,
fall within the jurisdiction of the government or governments
Britain].
150. Id.
151. Id. See section V infra.
152. Dep't of the Treasury, Economic Progress Report, No. 121 (May 1980) [Great
Britain).
153. Id.
154. This subject is dealt with in Title I of the Kemp-Garcia bill, "Designation of Pri-
vate Jobs and Enterprise Zones." H.R. 7563, tit. I.
155. Id. tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(a).
156. Id. § 7871(a)(2). The first enterprise zone bill, H.R. 7240, did not provide this
alternative.
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designating the zone.15 7 Thus a zone may come under the jurisdic-
tion of more than one local government, but only if each commu-
nity consents to the designation. Second, the boundary of the zone
must be continuous. 58 A city can not use its poorest blocks to cre-
ate a confusing checkerboard zone, but nothing in the Kemp-Gar-
cia bill prevents a city from designating more than one zone if all
other requirements are met. Third, at least 4,000 persons must live
in the zone. 59 The result of this politically attractive low threshold
is that rural regions as well as inner city neighborhoods can qual-
ify. A special provision is made for Indian reservations, which need
not meet the population requirement. 160 Fourth, levels of unem-
ployment and poverty in the zone must be high enough to warrant
the designation. " ' The bill provides three options by which an ap-
plicant can satisfy the fourth requirement.' e2 Under option A, the
requirement is met if at least thirty percent of the families residing
in the zone live below the poverty level"' and unemployment for
the past two years must have run at least twice the national aver-
age. '4 Under option B, unemployment for the past two years must
have run at least three times the national average. 165 Under option
C, at least fifty percent of the families residing in the zone must
live below the poverty level.' 6 These are rigid standards, appropri-
ately designed to restrict enterprise zones to the nation's most eco-
157. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, 7871(c)(1)(A).
158. Id. § 7871(c)(1)(B).
159. Id. § 7871(c)(1)(C)(i). The bill does not indicate whether the population of the zone
is to be measured by the last official census (which may be inaccurate in a poor community,
especially if illegal aliens are present) or by some other means.
160. Id. § 7871(c)(1)(C)(ii). H.R. 7240 did not contain this provision.
161. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(c)(2).
162. Id.
163. The Kemp-Garcia bill defines the poverty level as, "85% percent of the average
lower living standard income level determined annually by the Secretary of Labor and pub-
lished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics." Id. § 7871(c)(3). H.R. 7249, by contrast, proposed
using figures compiled by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census to determine
the number of families below the poverty level. H.R. 7249, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, §
7871(c)(2). According to an adviser to Rep. Garcia, the change was requested because Rep.
Garcia believes that the Bureau of Labor statistics are more readily attainable. Telephone
interview with Paul Bardack, Legal Adviser to Rep. Robert Garcia (Nov. 5, 1980).
164. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(c)(2)(A). Unemployment figures may
be derived from any source acceptable to the Secretary of Commerce. Id. § 7871(c)(4).
165. Id. § 7871(c)(2)(B).
166. Id. § 7871(c)(2)(C).
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nomically depressed areas.167
An applicant must meet one final requirement. Every local gov-
ernment seeking federal approval of an enterprise zone must per-
manently reduce the effective real property tax rate'" in the zone
by at least twenty percent. 169 The entire reduction need not be
made immediately; a locality has four years to make a "ratable"
reduction after the Secretary of Commerce approves the designa-
tion.17 0 The requirement is made even less burdensome by a guar-
antee in the bill that the federal government will disregard the re-
duction in determining aid to state and local governments.1 7 1 The
requirement, while commendable for its demand of a local commit-
ment, is nonetheless troubling. As previously indicated, non-con-
tractual perpetual exemptions are usually viewed by the courts as
gratuities which may be terminated.17 2 Furthermore, the bill fails
to recognize that many school districts rely heavily on local taxes
for their funding and that some local bond issues are guaranteed
by property taxes. s17  Congress should consider an alternative to
167. A fact sheet on enterprise zones prepared by Rep. Kemp cites a House Information
Services computer study which used 1970 data to estimate what proportion of the nation
would be eligible for enterprise zone status. The study concluded that only one and a half
percent of the nation's city dwellers live in areas which qualify, but that up to five percent
of the total population of the United States is included when rural areas are added. J. Kzmp,
THE URBAN Jos AND ENToRmpisz ZONE AcT. SOME QuESMONS AND ANSWERS (1980). The
controversy which surrounded the 1980 Census raised doubt about the accuracy and availa-
bility of any data derived from the Census.
168. The bill defines the effective real property tax rate as "the rate of the real property
tax multiplied by the percentage of assessed value which is subject to such rate." H.R. 7563,
tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(d)(2).
169. Id. § 7871(d)(1). The base rate which must be reduced by 20% is the rate in effect
when the application is submitted. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. tit. I, sec. 101(c). H.R. 7240 did not contain this guarantee.
172. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. A foreseeable difficulty is that businesses
will move to an enterprise zone relying on the permanent tax reduction, and the public will
then call for an end to the favorable rates. The businesses could argue that the local govern-
ment should be estopped from raising the tax rate, at least for a reasonable time, but the
weight of authority would support a government contention that the abatement was a gratu-
ity which could be terminated. See, e.g., Dodge v. Worcester, 129 Vt. 441, 282 A.2d 799
(1971); Grossman v. Wagner, 20 Misc. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Miller v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 79 Wyo. 502, 337 P.2d 262 (1959).
173. See generally United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Flushing
Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1976), supporting creditor's rights on municipal bond issues in the face of legislative at-
tempts to alter the terms of the issues; see also Bond, Enhancing the Security Behind
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this requirement.1 74
Under the proposed legislation, once a local or state government
submits its application, the Secretary of Commerce conducts a re-
view to see if the applicant has fulfilled all the requirements for
enterprise zone status.1 7' The Secretary is instructed to pay partic-
ular attention to the local government's plan to make a permanent
reduction in real property tax rates,17 6 apparently because the plan
is the best available indicator of local commitment. The Secretary
and the appropriate agencies within the Department of Commerce
then have the exclusive authority to approve or reject the applica-
tion. 1 77 Once an enterprise zone is designated, it remains in effect
for ten years.17 8 The clock for each zone begins to run on the first
of January following its approval by the Secretary of Commerce.17'
Thus all zones go into effect on the first of January and wind up on
the last day of December, simplifying many tax returns in the
zone. Exactly for which ten years a zone is in effect will vary from
zone to zone.180
In only one instance may a zone's designation be revoked before
its ten years have elapsed. The Secretary of Commerce has the au-
thority to revoke a designation whenever a local government fails
to comply "substantially" with the requirement for a permanent
real property tax reduction in the zone.181 Few zones should be af-
Municipal Obligations: Flushing and U.S. Trust Lead the Way, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1
(1977).
174. See section V infra.
175. The Secretary has the power to prescribe the form of the application and to require
any information necessary to make a decision. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, §
7871(a)(2).
176. Id. The bill requires only that the local government make "assurances satisfactory
to the Secretary" that it will actually reduce real property tax rates in the zone. Id.
177. Id. § 7871(a)(1). The bill does not indicate whether existing agencies in the Depart-
ment of Commerce or some new office will be responsible for processing the applications.
178. Id. § 7871(b)(1). The original bill did not limit the term of a zone's designation.
H.R. 7240, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(b)(1).
179. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(b)(1).
180. Because the Kemp-Garcia bill does not impose any-deadlines for filing applications
with the Secretary, some zones could begin on January 1, 1982 and remain in effect through
December 31, 1991, while others could begin on January 1, 1983 and remain in effect
through December 31, 1992. But within each zone, the same ten year period applies to all.
Id. Therefore, a business which opens during the eighth year of an enterprise zone is enti-
tled to only two years of benefits. Congress should consider alternative measures which are
better calculated to ensure the continued development of each zone. See section V infra.
181. H.R. 7563, tit. I, sec. 101(a), subch. C, § 7871(b)(2). The word "substantially" would
[Vol. IX
1981] KEMP-GARCIA BILL 687
fected by this provision. If for some reason a local government can-
not make the twenty percent cut in its tax rate, it can argue that a
lesser cut "substantially" complies with the statute. Further, the
bill provides that no revocation may go into effect until the last
day of December following the first full year after the Secretary's
decision. 8s This period of one to two years should give local legis-
lators ample opportunity to redesignate the zone by complying
with the statute.
An area may seek a designation as both an enterprise zone and a
foreign trade zone.183 In fact, the Kemp-Garcia bill encourages the
dual designation by requesting the Foreign Trade Zone Board to
expedite its review of applications submitted by enterprise
zones.18 4 Sponsors of the bill hope that industries which employ
unskilled workers to assemble foreign components into final prod-
ucts will want to locate in the dually designated zones. 8 Even a
foreign trade zone which does nothing but provide warehouses
used for temporary storage,1 8s would contribute to the redevelop-
ment of an economically depressed area.
seem to invite litigation. A 20% property tax cut in depressed areas should not be so oner-
ous as to require a loophole.
182. Id. In prescribing the effective dates of a zone, the bill applies the same rules to
revocations as to designations. Thus, despite a revocation, a zone can only be terminated on
a December 31.
183. Id. tit. I, sec. 102. See Free Trade Zones-Worldwide, J. COM., Oct. 20, 1980, § 4,
for a complete survey of free trade zones around the world and the benefits they offer. Free
trade zones, referred to as foreign trade zones in the United States, are essentially "an im-
porter's sanctuary from the host country's customs officers-a designated area, usually in or
near a port, that is declared to be outside the host's customs territory." Id. at 1, col. 2. Of
the some 355 free trade zones worldwide, approximately 60 are foreign trade zones located
in the United States. Id. at 15, cols. 1-2. Zones vary in the United States, but they generally
offer importers and exporters a place to store goods quickly and cheaply, without full cus-
toms formalities. Feldman, Trade Zone Growth Hitting Peak, J. COM., Oct. 22, 1979, § 4, at
1, col. 3.
184. Id. tit. I, sec. 102(1). The bill further provides that the Board should take into
account the economic potential of enterprise zones when reviewing their applications. Id.
sec. 102(2). The Board should also supply technical assistance to the enterprise zone appli-
cants. Id. sec. 102(3).
185. J. KEMP, supra note 167, at 12.
186. Most foreign trade zones are used primarily for warehousing. Feldman, Trade Zone
Growth Hitting Peak, J. COM., Oct. 22, 1979, § 4, at 1, cols. 2-3.
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B. Kemp-Garcia Incentivesg' 7
The Kemp-Garcia bill provides several tax incentives and
other inducements to draw businesses to enterprise zones. First,
the bill amends the Internal Revenue Code to reduce social secur-
ity payroll taxes for both employers and employees in a zone.'"
The reduction, however, is not an automatic one. It applies only to
"eligible employees," whom the bill defines as those workers who
perform at least half their services in one or more enterprise
zones.""' A further complication is that employees are eligible only
for the duration of a payroll period;190 hence, a determination must
be made at the end of each payroll period as to which employees
are currently eligible for the reduction. These eligibility rules are
unnecessarily burdensome. If their purpose is to exclude businesses
which might operate "fronts" in enterprise zones to take advantage
of the social security tax reduction, then the bill should provide a
simpler means of gauging sincerity. Perhaps defining eligible em-
ployees as persons who work for zone businesses which employ a
certain percentage of zone residents would be an easier, but
equally accurate, test to apply."9'
Eligible employees do not all receive the same social security tax
reductions under the Kemp-Garcia bill. The bill draws a distinc-
tion between those eligible employees who are under the age of
twenty-one at the close of a payroll period and those who are
twenty-one and over.'" The former are entitled to a social security
tax reduction of ninety percent, while the latter are entitled to a
fifty percent reduction."'3 The social security taxes payable by em-
ployers are reduced by the same proportions.'" Thus the bill en-
courages employers to hire young workers. Given the high rate of
187. This subject is dealt with in Title 11 of the Kemp-Garcia bill, "Tax Incentives."
H.R. 7563, tit. II.
188. Id. tit. IIA, sec. 201.
189. Id. tit. IIA, sec. 201(a), § 3126(b).
190. Id.
191. In another part of the bill, "qualified businesses" are defined to take residency of
workers into account. Id. tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(2). See notes 202-07 supra and accompany-
ing text. Congress should consider granting the social security tax abatements to "qualified
businesses and their employees."





unemployment among teenagers in impoverished areas, this is an
especially important and commendable feature of the bill.
The Kemp-Garcia bill expressly provides that the reduction in
social security taxes "shall not affect the eligibility of any individ-
ual for benefits under the Social Security Act nor the amount or
extent of such benefits.""' This provision represents the major
cost of the bill to the taxpayers.'" Every dollar of social security
taxes not collected because of the Kemp-Garcia abatement must
be replaced with general revenues. 97 The bill instructs the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to make a quarterly estimate of the amount of
taxes lost due to the reduction and to transfer that amount to trust
funds established for the benefit of the social security system. 198
A second tax incentive offered to lure businesses to enterprise
zones is a reduction in capital gains tax rates for zone busi-
nesses.' 99 For corporations, the rate is reduced from twenty-eight
percent to fifteen percent on sales and exchanges of qualified prop-
erty.200 The Kemp-Garcia bill offers a series of definitions to aid in
a determination of whether the lower rate applies. Qualified prop-
erty includes both real and tangible personal property which is
used predominantly by the taxpayer in the active conduct of a
trade or business in a zone;' 0 ' it also includes any interest in a
qualified business.' 0 ' For a business to be qualified, it must meet
three requirements. First, it must actively engage, in the conduct of
a trade or business. 08 Second, at least half of its employees must
be qualified employees,"° who are defined as those workers per-
195. Id. tit. IIA, sec. 202. The original enterprise zone bill, H.R. 7240, did not contain
this provision.
196. Rep. Kemp estimates that this provision could cost taxpayers approximately $1 bil-
lion annually. J. KEMP, supra note 167, at 5. See note 229 infra for a cost analysis of the bill.
197. H.R. 7563, tit. 11A, sec. 203.
198. Id. The Secretary is also instructed to make appropriate adjustments for erroneous
estimates in previous quarters. Id.
199. Id. tit. IB.
200. Compare I.R.C. § 1201(a) with H.R. 7563, tit. IIB, sec. 211(a).
201. H.R. 7563, tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(1). Homeowners in the zone also benefit from this
definition. Real property sold or exchanged by individuals whose principal residence is in
the zone is classified as qualified property for the purposes of the tax reduction. Id. tit. IIB,
sec. 211(b)(d)(1)(B)(ii).
202. Id. tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(1)(C). The business interest may be in "a corporation,
partnership, or other entity. . . ." Id.
203. Id. tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(2)(A).
204. Id. tit. 11B, sec. 211(b)(d)(2)(B).
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forming substantially all of their services in one or more enterprise
zones in the trade or business of their employer. 0 5 Third, at least
half of the business' qualified employees, on the average, must be
residents of an enterprise zone.206 This final requirement, missing
from the original enterprise zone bill, was added at the request of
Representative Garcia.10 7 It should prevent businesses with little
interest in hiring local workers from using enterprise zones as ten
year tax havens.
Capital gains tax rates are also reduced for taxpayers other than
corporations.20 8 Under the bill, non-corporate taxpayers' deduc-
tions on sales or exchanges of qualified property2'09 are increased
from sixty to eighty percent of their net capital gain. 10 The bill
further exempts all taxpayers from minimum taxes on capital
gains.2 11 As an added incentive for both corporate and other tax-
payers, zone property for the purposes of capital gains taxes re-
mains qualified after the zone's designation ends. 1' The property
loses its qualified status only after its first sale or exchange follow-
ing the end of the zone's term. 1 8
A third major tax incentive available to enterprise zone busi-
nesses is a reduction in corporate income taxes."' The reduction,
which applies to the taxable income of all corporations classified as
qualified businesses, 2 5 is between fifteen and seventeen and one
half percent of the present rate depending on the particular tax
205. Id. tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(3).
206. Id. tit. IIB, sec. 211(b)(d)(2)(C). The requirement includes a grace period to give
new businesses time to hire zone residents. However, "for each taxable year after the first
taxable year," the requirement must be met unless the business can show extenuating cir-
cumstances which satisfy the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
207. Telephone interview with Paul Bardack, Legal Adviser to Rep. Robert Garcia (Nov.
5, 1980).
208. H.R. 7563, tit. 1iB, sec. 212.
209. Qualified property is defined as it was for the purposes of the capital gains tax
reduction for corporations. See notes 201-02 supra and accompanying text.
210. Compare I.R.C. § 1202(a) with H.R. 7563, tit. IIB, sec. 212(a)(1).
211. H.R. 7563, tit. IIB, sec. 213.
212. Id. tit. IIB, secs. 211(b)(d)(4), 212(a)(2). This exemption was not included in the
original enterprise zone bill.
213. Id. tit. IIB, secs. 211(b)(d)(4)(B), 212(a)(2)(B). The bill wisely avoids offering an
inducement to sell or exchange zone property toward the end of the ten year life of a zone.
214. Id. tit. IIC.
215. Qualified businesses are defined as they were for the purposes of the capital gains
tax reduction. See notes 202-07 supra and accompanying text.
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bracket."" Clearly the savings are significant for both large and
small corporations, but not as impressive as those attainable under
the Virgin Islands or British programs. 17 Because the reduction in
corporate income tax rates will be of prime importance to most
businesses contemplating operations in a zone, Congress should
make certain that this incentive is adequate.
A fourth incentive, designed especially for small businesses, is an
accelerated depreciation schedule. s The schedule applies only to
qualified businesses"29 whose aggregate bases of property placed in
service during the taxable year does not exceed $500,000.220 When
the schedule applies, the business may use a three year straight
line method of depreciation for all property placed in service dur-
ing the taxable year.2" The current bill also allows a full invest-
ment credit on this property.22 These provisions not only simplify
bookkeeping for small businesses, but also allow businesses to re-
tain more of their earnings during their early years.
A fifth incentive further simplifies bookkeeping for small busi-
nesses in a zone. The bill provides that qualified businesses 2 8
whose annual gross receipts in no prior year have exceeded
$1,500,000 may choose to use the cash receipts and disbursements
216. Compare I.R.C. § 11(b) with H.R. 7563, tit. IIC, sec. 221(c):
I.R.C. H.R. 7563
Taxable income rate rate Reduction
$25,000.00 and less 17% 14% 17.6%
$25,000.01 to $50,000.00 20% 17% 15.0%
$50,000.01 to $75,000.00 30% 25% 16.7%
$75,000.01 to $100,000.00 40% 34% 15.0%
$100,000.00 and more 46% 39% 15.2%
Congress should consider an incentive, such as a corporate tax credit refund, for zone busi-
nesses which have no taxable income.
217. The Virgin Islands provides 90% "subsidies" on corporate income taxes paid by
eligible businesses. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 713(b) (Supp. 1979). See notes 136-38 supra
and accompanying text. The British program provides zone corporations with total develop-
ment land tax exemptions. Dep't of the Treasury, Economic Progress Report, No. 121 (May
1980) [Great Britain]. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
218. H.R. 7563 tit. IID, sec. 231.
219. Qualified businesses are defined as they were for the purposes of the capital gains
tax reduction. See notes 202-07 supra and accompanying text.
220. H.R. 7563, tit. IID, sec. 231 (a)(r)(2).
221. Id. tit. IID, sec. 231(a)(r)(1).
222. Id. tit. IID, sec. 231(b). H.R. 7240 did not contain this provision.
223. Qualified businesses are defined as they were for the purposes of the capital gains
tax reduction. See notes 202-07 supra and accompanying text.
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method of accounting.22' Further, any new business in a zone, no
matter how large, may use the cash method during its first taxable
year as a qualified business. 25 The flexibility of the cash method
and the relief it provides from the more complicated accrual
method of accounting should be useful in attracting small busi-
nesses, which often cannot afford the services of outside account-
ants, to enterprise zones.
A final incentive relates to net operating loss carryovers.22 The
bill amends the Internal Revenue Code to extend net operating
loss carryovers from seven to ten years for all qualified zone busi-
nesses.217 The provision is intended to "give businesses an incen-
tive to hang on through initial losses,"' "2 8 an important considera-
tion in the long-range development of enterprise zones.
How much will all these incentives cost the taxpayer? Represen-
tative Kemp estimates that if half of the eligible areas in the
United States were designated as enterprise zones, then the total
amount of lost tax revenues could run as high as $1.5 billion annu-
ally.2 9 Few would argue that the cost, when compared to amounts
spent on other urban programs over the years, is too high.8
V. Recommendations and Conclusion
The current version of the Kemp-Garcia bill is legally sound. Its
principal strength rests in the fact that it proposes to redevelop
targeted areas with minimal amounts of government spending and
oversight. Congress' first concern, therefore, should be to retain the
224. H.R. 7563, tit. lID, sec. 232.
225. Id. tit. lID, sec. 232(a)(f)(3).
226. Id. tit. I1D, sec. 233.
227. Compare I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B) with H.R. 7563, tit. lID, sec. 233(a)(J).
228. J. KEMP, supra note 167, at 11.
229. Id. at 4-5. Rep. Kemp estimates the annual cost of the bill as follows: 1) social
security tax reductions: $948 million; 2) capital gains tax reductions: $75 million; 3) corpo-
rate income tax reductions: $131 million; 4) accelerated depreciation schedule: $53 million;
5) cash method of accounting: $12 million; 6) extended net operating loss carryovers: negligi-
ble; 7) administrative costs: $19 million; 8) Foreign Trade Zones Board assistance: $2 mil-
lion. Rep. Kemp cautions that these are rough estimates, but believes that they may be on
the high side because they assume no reflow due to the incentives. Id.
230. The New York Times recently commented that even if the lost taxes amount to
$1.5 billion annually, the cost "is still much less than existing urban grant programs and, in
theory, some of the lost revenue would be offset by the taxes paid by the businesses and
workers as they became productive." Rosenbaum, Reagan Calls His Version 'Urban Enter-
prise Zones,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
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virtues of the bill through the political bargaining that lies ahead.
Although not every area will benefit directly from the bill, Con-
gress must make certain that its incentives apply with full force to
the particular areas and groups most in need of assistance. In addi-
tion, every attempt to burden zone businesses with unnecessary
paperwork must be thwarted. Furthermore, Congress should con-
tinue to court the small businessman, an important factor in the
growth of any community.3 1
The Kemp-Garcia bill deserves praise for not relaxing wage,
safety, health, environmental, or fair labor standards in enterprise
zones. Zone businesses which, despite all their tax breaks, can only
operate by paying substandard wages or by excessively polluting
the air need not be encouraged. In fact, Congress should include
provisions in the bill, similar to those found in the Kennedy bill, 82
which require zone businesses to maintain all federal and local
standards.
Several changes to the Kemp-Garcia bill are in order. Congress
should more clearly define which employers and employees are eli-
gible to receive social security tax reductions.23 In designating a
zone, Congress should not require a "permanent" real property tax
reduction which it cannot guarantee.8 4 Instead, it should require a
reduction only during the ten year period that the federal govern-
ment can exert its influence in the zone. If local school budgets and
bond issues are adversely affected by the ten year reduction, then
Congress should be willing to supply the schools with extra funds
and the bondholders with extra guarantees.
The current bill does not make the Commerce and Treasury De-
partments accountable for their decisions concerning which areas
qualify as enterprise zones and which businesses are eligible for
231. Senator Boschwitz emphasized the importance of encouraging the small business-
man when he introduced the enterprise zone bill in the Senate: "The bill focuses mainly on
small business because small business creates the vast majority of new jobs. In the past 10
years two-thirds of the new jobs in the private sector came from businesses with less than 20
employees." 126 CONG. Ruc. S7005 (daily ed. June 13, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Boschwitz).
See generally, D. Birch, The Job Generation Process, reprinted in Economic Development
Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 386-408 (1979).
232. S. 2088, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, §§ 101(a)(3)(c), 101(e).
233. See notes 188-91 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 168-74 supra and accompanying text.
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exemptions. Although a certain amount of latitude is desirable, the
departments should be required to file annual reports subject to
Congressional review. Congress should also encourage the expe-
dited judicial review of all contested enterprise zone decisions.28 6
The Kennedy bill provided that businesses "relocating from one
area to another" should not be entitled to the benefits of the pro-
gram, although expanding businesses should be eligible.28 Con-
gress should consider a similar clause to discourage businesses
from relocating in enterprise zones solely to take advantage of
Kemp-Garcia benefits. By requiring that "eligible businesses" be in
the nature of either new or expanded operations, Congress could
help preserve communities adjacent to enterprise zones.
The Kemp-Garcia proposals are closely related to the tax incen-
tive programs already in effect in the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico,
and Great Britain."' Clearly there are differences among the vari-
ous programs, such as the incentives they offer and the regions
they involve, but essentially their purposes and policies are the
same. Congress should make a thorough study of these programs.
It should conduct hearings in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
to discover what the successes and failures of their programs have
been.
Finally, Congress should consider making enterprise zones even
more attractive to developers. To supplement the incentives for
businesses, incentives which would encourage new housing should
also be weighed. A statement containing assurances similar to Brit-
ain's promise to "reduce to a bare minimum its requests for statis-
tical information" from zone businesses 3 9 would be a welcome ad-
dition to the bill. Furthermore, Congress should make certain that
the maximum ten year period of benefits for each zone is adequate
235. Similar systems of accountability are used in Massachusetts and Alaska to monitor
state development finance corporations. B. DANIELS & M. KIESCHNICK, DEVELOPMENT Fi-
NANCE: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS, PART II 47 (1979).
236. A business should not have to spend several years in court while a zone's term is
running. Congress should consider a clause similar to the one governing the review of certain
Federal Trade Commission decisions: "Such proceedings in the court of appeals [or district
court in the case of Kemp-Garcia legislation] shall be given precedence over other cases
pending therein, and shall be in every way expedited." 15 U.S.C. § 45(e) (1976).
237. S. 2088, 90th Cong., 1st Seas., §2.
238. See notes 116-38, 147-53 supra and accompanying text.




to achieve real progress in the nation's most impoverished areas.
Congress may find it necessary to include renewal provisions, such
as those in Britain, 240 for zones which have not achieved complete
success after ten years. Alternatively, a minimum period of exemp-
tion should be available to businesses which open after a zone is
already several years old. Otherwise, virtually all development in a
zone will take place during its first few years. Congress should pro-
mote the continued growth of these economically depressed areas
and not foster "boom towns" which fade as quickly as they
blossom.
The Kemp-Garcia bill proposes an approach to urban redevelop-
ment which is new only in the sense that the federal government
has never attempted anything like it before. Tax incentive pro-
grams have often worked well in the past. Now Congress has an
opportunity to offer major incentives which should go a long way
toward rebuilding the nation's economically depressed areas. Rep-
resentatives Kemp and Garcia have submitted a proposal which
deserves the attention of Congress and the nation.
Robert W. Benjamin
240. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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